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1. Introduction 
The Japanese government’s outstanding debt as a ratio of GDP is currently in 
excess of 150% and is by far the highest among the major industrialized nations, due in 
large part to the repeated economic stimulus packages implemented during the decade-long 
recession of the 1990s.  Thus, fiscal reconstruction is an urgent priority of the Japanese 
government, and it has pledged to restore the primary balance (defined as government 
revenues excluding bond revenues minus government expenditures excluding interest 
payments and debt redemption) to surplus by the early 2010s.   The Japanese government 
plans to achieve fiscal reconstruction through a combination of spending cuts and tax 
increases since neither of them will be enough to do the trick by itself.    With respect to tax 
increases, the Japanese government appears to be planning to rely primarily on hikes in 
the consumption tax, but in March 2006, the Fiscal System Council (Zaisei Seido-tou 
Shingikai) released the results of its projections showing that the consumption tax will 
have to be raised sharply from the current 5% to a full 22% by 2015 if fiscal reconstruction 
is to be achieved by relying solely on hikes in the consumption tax.     
The authors are strongly against using hikes in the consumption tax to achieve 
fiscal reconstruction, at least if the current highly regressive structure of the consumption 
tax is not changed.  Unless the consumption tax can be made more progressive by 
converting it to an expenditure tax or by setting a lower tax rate for food and other 
necessities than for other goods, we favor relying instead on increasing income tax revenue 
by stricter enforcement and/or greater progressivity.     
In Japan, there is substantial tax evasion, especially by farmers and the 
self-employed, and thus revenue from the income tax could be increased considerably even  2
without changing tax rates if enforcement were made stricter (for example, by introducing 
a taxpayer identification number system, increasing the number of tax auditors, and/or 
increasing the proportion of tax returns that are audited).    Moreover, stricter enforcement 
of the income tax would simultaneously enhance the inter-occupational equity thereof. 
If stricter enforcement of the income tax does not increase tax revenue by a 
sufficient amount, we favor increasing tax revenue by increasing the progressivity of the 
income tax.    Since the burden of income taxes in Japan is far lower than in other countries, 
there is considerable scope for raising income taxes and making them more progressive, 
and doing so will allow us to raise more revenue and to improve the equity of the tax at the 
same  time.   
We favor achieving fiscal reconstruction by raising revenue from the income tax 
rather than by raising revenue from the consumption tax primarily because of equity 
considerations.  The income tax is far more progressive (and hence more equitable) than 
the consumption tax to begin with, and moreover, if we enforce it more strictly and increase 
its progressivity, it would generate more revenue and, at the same time, become even more 
equitable (across occupations as well as across income groups), thereby killing two birds 
with one stone.     
If there is no choice but to rely partly or wholly on hikes in the consumption tax as 
a way of increasing tax revenue and achieving fiscal reconstruction, we favor increasing the 
progressivity of the consumption tax by introducing a differential tax rate for food and 
other necessities and eliminating the distortions caused by the consumption tax using the 
means described in detail in section 4.  3
  In the remainder of this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of personal taxes 
(defined to include consumption and income taxes), describe and evaluate the past and 
present structure of personal taxes in Japan, and based on our findings, make a number of 
policy recommendations about how to reform personal taxes in Japan.   We find that the 
structure of Japan’s current consumption and income taxes is problematic from the 
viewpoints of both efficiency and equity and propose a reform package that improves both 
the efficiency and equity of Japan’s personal taxes and, at the same time, achieves fiscal 
reconstruction.    
  The organization of the paper is as follows:   In section 2, we conduct a theoretical 
analysis of personal taxes (consumption and income taxes) from the viewpoints of efficiency 
and equity; in section 3, we describe and evaluate the past and present structure of 
personal taxes in Japan from the viewpoints of efficiency, equity, and countercyclical policy; 
and finally, in section 4, we make policy recommendations based on our findings.   
  
2. A Theoretical Analysis of Personal Taxes 
  In this section, we conduct a theoretical analysis of personal taxes (consumption 
and income taxes).  When evaluating a tax, there are two criteria that are commonly 
used—efficiency and equity.  Efficiency refers to whether a tax distorts the 
decision-making process of economic agents (i.e., whether it causes an excess burden), and 
equity refers to whether a tax has favorable or unfavorable distributional consequences.  
In this section, we evaluate the consumption and income taxes from the viewpoints of 
efficiency and equity.  4
 
2.1. Efficiency 
First, we analyze the consumption and income taxes from the viewpoint of 
efficiency. 
 
2.1.1.  The Consumption Tax     
The consumption tax introduces at least two distortions: it distorts the allocation of 
consumption among different consumption goods (excluding leisure), and it distorts the 
allocation of consumption between leisure and other consumption goods.         
Looking first at the distortion in the allocation of consumption among different 
consumption goods (excluding leisure), the consumption tax distorts this allocation decision 
by raising the prices of some or all consumption goods.̍  A comprehensive consumption 
tax raises the prices of all consumption goods (excluding leisure) by the same percentage, 
but this does not necessarily mean that such a tax does not cause any distortions.  The 
reason is that different consumption goods have different compensated price elasticities of 
demand.    Even if the prices of all goods are increased by the same percentage, goods whose 
compensated price elasticity of demand is relatively high (in absolute value) will show a 
more pronounced decline in demand than goods whose compensated price elasticity of 
demand is relatively low (in absolute value). 
  Ramsey (1927) first pointed out this problem and proposed the “inverse elasticity 
rule” or “Ramsey rule” as a way of eliminating the distortion in the allocation of 
consumption among different consumption goods caused by the imposition of a  5
consumption tax.  This rule states that the tax rate of each good should be inversely 
proportional to the absolute value of the compensated price elasticity of demand for that 
good.  As pointed out by Hatta (2004a, 2004b), this rule is not very useful in actual 
practice because it suffers from an important defect: it makes the unrealistic assumption 
that all cross-price elasticities of demand are zero and that even goods with a high 
compensated price elasticity of demand (in absolute value) have no substitutes.    Moreover, 
since necessities often have low compensated price elasticities of demand, applying 
Ramsey’s (1927) inverse elasticity rule will require us to impose higher tax rates on 
necessities, making the tax regressive.  Thus, implementing the inverse elasticity rule 
may or may not improve efficiency, and moreover, it will have an adverse impact on equity. 
  Looking next at the distortion in the allocation of consumption between leisure and 
other consumption goods, it is almost impossible to accurately measure the leisure 
consumption of each individual (i.e., the number of hours each individual devotes to leisure), 
and thus it is not feasible to impose a tax on leisure.  And if all consumption goods other 
than leisure are taxed while leisure is not, this will lead to a distortion in the allocation of 
consumption between leisure and other consumption goods, with leisure being 
overconsumed and all other consumption goods being underconsumed. 
  Corlett and Hagueʢ1953ʣpointed out that this distortion can be alleviated by 
taxing complements of leisure (such as summer homes, yachts, golfing goods, movie tickets, 
etc.) more heavily and substitutes of leisure (such as washing machines, vacuum cleaners, 
electric ranges, etc.) more lightly than other consumption goods. 
  6
2.1.2.  Income Tax 
The income tax introduces at least two distortions.  The first distortion caused by 
the income tax is that, by taxing labor income, it discourages labor, or to put it another way, 
it subsidizes leisure, as in the case of the consumption tax.  Thus, it leads to an 
undersupply of labor and to an overconsumption of leisure.  The solution is to make labor 
income tax-exempt. 
The second distortion caused by the income tax is that, by taxing capital income 
(interest, dividends, rent, etc.), it discourages saving.  The solution is to make capital 
income tax-exempt. 
However, if both labor income and capital income are made tax-exempt, the 
government will not be able to raise any tax revenue.  Thus, the government needs to 
impose taxes on either labor income and/or capital income.  It can be shown that it is 
optimal to tax labor income if labor supply has the lower compensated price elasticity and 
to tax capital income if saving has the lower compensated price elasticity.  It is believed 
that labor supply has a lower compensated price elasticity than saving, and if that is the 
case, it is optimal to make capital income tax-exempt and to tax only labor income (i.e., to 
impose a wage tax).   
 
2.1.3.  Conclusion 
As we have seen, both the consumption and income taxes cause distortions in 
consumer behavior.   The only tax that does not cause any distortions is a poll or lumpsum 
tax, which collects the same amount of tax from each individual, or if individuals are  7
heterogeneous, a poll or lumpsum tax that collects the same amount of tax from all 
individuals of each type, but poll taxes are unrealistic, not to mention regressive.  Thus, 
the only choice is to impose a tax that causes one kind of distortion or another. 
  As Hatta (2004a, 2004b) notes, it is often the case that, by mitigating one 
distortion, one exacerbates a different distortion.  For example, raising the tax rate on 
complements of leisure and lowering the tax rate on substitutes for leisure will mitigate the 
distortion in the allocation of consumption between leisure and other consumption goods, 
but at the same time, it will exacerbate the distortion in the allocation of consumption 
among different consumption goods (excluding leisure).    Thus, there is a trade-off between 
these two kinds of distortions. 
    An optimal tax structure is one that takes account of this trade-off and maximizes 
social welfare.    According to Hatta (2004a, 2004b), an optimal tax structure is one in which 
a higher tax rate is imposed on strong complements of leisure, a lower tax rate is imposed 
on strong substitutes for leisure, and a uniform tax rate is imposed on all other goods (goods 
with a low cross-price elasticity of demand with leisure).    In other words, he finds that it is 
optimal to use consumption taxes to alleviate the distortion in the allocation of 
consumption between leisure and other consumption goods.     
 
2.2.  Equity 
In this section, we analyze the consumption and income taxes from the viewpoint 
of equity. 
  8
2.2.1.  Consumption Tax 
Since the propensity to consume generally decreases with income, a sales tax that 
is imposed at the time of sale will be regressive and hence inequitable.̎    The solution is to 
impose an expenditure tax instead of a sales tax.  An expenditure tax is a tax in which 
individuals file a tax return and pay a tax on the difference between their income and their 
saving (where saving is calculated as the net increase in their assets).  The two taxes are 
similar in the sense that they are both imposed on consumption but they are different in 
the sense that a sales tax cannot be made progressive while an expenditure tax can be 
made as progressive as one wants.  The problem is that an expenditure tax is difficult to 
implement and has never been tried in actual practice in any country.     
Given that an expenditure tax is not practical, the second-best solution is to impose 
a sales tax but to impose a lower or zero tax rate on food and other necessities and to 
impose a higher tax rate on luxury goods.    There are many examples both in Japan and in 
other countries of certain goods being exempted entirely from consumption taxes or of 
differential tax rates being imposed on different commodity groups.  For example, in the 
United States, there is no national consumption tax, but most states have a state sales tax, 
and in about half of the states that have a sales tax, food is tax-exempt, and in most states 
that have a sales tax, prescription drugs are tax-exempt.  As another example, in many 
European countries, the consumption (value added) tax has two or three tiers, with a lower 
tax rate being levied on food, drugs, books, newspapers, etc.  As a final example, Japan 
imposed a commodity tax on certain consumption goods (primarily luxury goods) until the 
general consumption tax was introduced on April 1, 1989.    Thus, many countries including  9
Japan have made efforts to alleviate the regressivity of the consumption tax. 
 
2.2.2. Income Tax 
The income tax can be made as progressive as one wants, and thus it is easy to achieve 
equity using the income tax.     
 
2.2.3. Conclusion 
  Unless the consumption tax takes the form of an expenditure tax, which is not 
practical, it is difficult to achieve full equity using the consumption tax, and thus it is easier 
to achieve full equity using the income tax.     
 
2.3.  Consumption Tax or Income Tax? 
In order for the government to function, it needs tax revenue, and thus the 
government needs to impose one kind of tax or another.  The trick is to find a tax system 
that simultaneously achieves efficiency and equity.  The problem is that, although it is 
sometimes possible to achieve efficiency and equity simultaneously, the two objectives are 
often contradictory. 
For example, in the case of the consumption tax, since the compensated price 
elasticity of demand is often low (in absolute value) in the case of necessities, if we apply 
Ramsey’s (1927) inverse elasticity rule, we would have to set a higher tax rate for 
necessities than for other goods, and thus we would have to sacrifice equity for efficiency.  
By contrast, since Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule entails imposing a higher tax rate on  10
complements of leisure and since many complements of leisure are luxury goods, we can 
achieve both efficiency and equity simultaneously by implementing Corlett and Hague’s 
rule.  
In the case of the income tax, it is optimal from the viewpoint of efficiency to tax 
labor income more heavily than capital income (assuming that labor supply is more 
price-inelastic than saving), but in general, the share of capital income in total income rises 
with income, and thus from the viewpoint of equity, it is optimal to tax capital income more 
heavily than labor income.    Thus, the two objectives conflict in this case. 
Hatta (2004a, 2004b) argues that we should not attempt to achieve equity through 
the consumption tax because there are other taxes (such as the progressive income tax, the 
land tax, the inheritance tax, etc.) that are better suited to attaining equity.    Hatta (2004, 
2004b) asserts that we should leave the attainment of equity to these taxes and that we 
should use the consumption tax to alleviate the distortion in the allocation of consumption 
between leisure and other consumption goods by applying Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule, 
but as argued earlier, we can achieve both efficiency and equity simultaneously by applying 
Corlett and Hague’s rule.   
 
3.  An Evaluation of Personal Taxes in Japan 
In this section, we describe and evaluate the past and present structure of 
personal taxes in Japan from the viewpoints of both efficiency and equity. 
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3.1.   Consumption  Tax 
First, we describe and evaluate the past and present structure of Japan’s 
consumption tax. 
 
3.1.1.  Efficiency 
Until March 31, 1989, Japan did not have a general consumption tax but commodity 
taxes ranging from five to 30 percent were imposed on certain goods (mostly luxury goods).   
If we look at the structure of the commodity taxes, food and other goods with a low 
compensated price elasticity of demand (in absolute value) were tax-exempt, meaning that 
Ramsey’s (1927) inverse elasticity rule was not being followed and that the opposite was 
being done.    Looking next at whether the structure of the commodity taxes was consistent 
with Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule, many of the goods upon which commodity taxes were 
imposed are clearly close complements of leisure (such as golfing goods, billiard goods, 
motor boats, water game supplies, hand gliders, musical instruments, televisions, stereos, 
etc.), and some of them are close substitutes for leisure (such electric vacuum cleaners, 
electric washing machines, etc.) so it is not clear whether or not the structure of the 
commodity taxes was consistent with Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule.  However, it is 
probably the case that commodity taxes were imposed more frequently on complements of 
leisure than on substitutes for leisure, meaning that they alleviated the distortion in the 
allocation of consumption between leisure and other consumption goods to some extent, 
thereby improving efficiency. 
  The Japanese government abolished the commodity taxes on selected goods and  12
introduced a 3% general consumption tax on April 1, 1989, and raised the general 
consumption tax from 3% to 5% on April 1, 1997.    This general consumption tax is uniform, 
and thus it does not reflect either Ramsey’s (1927) inverse elasticity rule or Corlett and 
Hague’s (1953) rule.  Thus, it distorts both the allocation of consumption among different 
consumption goods (excluding leisure) as well as the allocation of consumption between 
leisure and other consumption goods and is not an efficient tax by any means.  However, 
unlike the earlier commodity taxes, food and other necessities with a relatively low 
compensated price elasticity of demand (in absolute value) are no longer tax-exempt, and 
thus the current general consumption tax is closer to Ramsey’s (1927) inverse elasticity 
rule than the earlier commodity taxes.  However, whereas the earlier commodity taxes 
adhered to Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule to some extent, the current general consumption 
tax does not adhere to this rule at all. 
  Thus, by moving from the earlier commodity taxes to the current general 
consumption tax, the distortion in the allocation of consumption among different 
consumption goods (excluding leisure) was alleviated but the distortion in the allocation of 
consumption between leisure and other consumption goods, a more serious problem, was 
exacerbated.  Thus, there is a high probability that the overall efficiency of the 
consumption tax declined due to the transition from commodity taxes to a general 
consumption tax. 
Moreover, another defect of the current general consumption tax is that it does not 
tax the imputed rent on owner-occupied housing, thereby distorting the housing tenure 
decision in favor of owner-occupied housing and against rental housing.      13
 
3.1.2.  Equity 
In the case of the commodity taxes that were in effect until March 31, 1989, food 
and other necessities were tax-exempt and a high tax rate was imposed on many luxury 
goods.  Thus,  the  earlier  commodity  taxes  achieved equity to a considerable extent. 
    However, the general consumption tax that was introduced on April 1, 1989, is a 
sales tax rather than an expenditure tax, and moreover, the tax rate on food and other 
necessities is not relatively low or zero and the tax rate on luxury goods is not relatively 
high.    Thus, it can be said to be a regressive and thus inequitable tax.   
 
3.1.3.  Conclusion 
As we have argued, the transition from commodity taxes to a general consumption tax 
probably reduced the efficiency of the consumption tax and clearly reduced the equity 
thereof.  Thus, from the viewpoint of optimal taxation, one cannot say that it was a 
desirable tax reform. 
 
3.2.  Income Tax 
Next, we describe and evaluate the past and present structure of Japan’s income tax. 
 
3.2.1.  Efficiency 
In the past, the Japanese tax code included many tax breaks for saving (capital 
income) such as the maruyuu system (the tax-free system for small bank and postal  14
deposits, trusts, public bonds, public bond investment trusts, and zaikei (property 
formation savings)), and as a result, the tax rate on capital income was probably lower than 
the tax rate on labor income.  Thus, (assuming that labor supply is more price-inelastic 
than saving) the structure of Japan’s income tax scored high with respect to efficiency.   
However, in recent years, the government has scaled back or eliminated many of 
the tax breaks for saving (capital income) that were in place earlier.  For example, the 
maruyuu system was restricted primarily to those aged 65 or older on March 31, 1988, and 
was abolished even for those aged 65 or older on December 31, 2006.  Moreover, capital 
gains on equity, which had previously been largely tax-exempt, became fully taxable, in 
principle, on April 1, 1989.    These changes have reduced the efficiency of the income tax. 
Turning to a separate issue, the progressivity of Japan’s income tax has declined 
over time, as discussed in section 3.2.2. below, and this will improve efficiency to the extent 
that it alleviates the disincentive effects on the labor supply of high-income individuals.  
However, since labor supply is believed to be relatively inelastic (see, for example, Ohtake, 
Takenaka and Yasui (2006)), the efficiency gains from reduced progressivity are 
presumably relatively small. 
 
3.2.2.  Equity 
Japan’s income tax is non-linear and progressive, but the degree of non-linearity 
and progressivity has declined over time.  Table 1 shows how the number of brackets and 
the range of tax rates have fluctuated over time, and as this table shows, the degree of 
non-linearity and progressivity and hence the equity of Japan’s income tax has declined  15
since the 1980s.  Table 1 seems to suggest that the progressivity of the income tax will be 
enhanced in 2007, but this is primarily an illusion.    It is true that the minimum tax rate of 
the national income tax will be lowered from 10% to 5% and that the top tax rate of the 
national income tax will be raised from 37% to 40%, but the local income tax, which 
currently ranges from 5% to 13%, will be made into a 10% uniform tax, meaning that the 
overall minimum tax rate and top tax rate will remain unchanged at 15% and 50%, 
respectively.  
 
Table 1: Trends in the Number of Brackets and in the Range of Tax Rates of the National 
Income Tax in Japan 
1971~83: 19 bracketsʢ10ʙ75ˋʣ 
1984~86: 15 brackets (10.5ʙ70ˋ) 
1987: 12 bracketsʢ10.5ʙ60ˋʣ 
1988: 6 bracketsʢ10ʙ60ˋʣ 
1989~98: 5 bracketsʢ10ʙ50%ʣ 
1999ʙ2006: 4 bracketsʢ10ʙ37ˋʣ 
2007~    :  6  brackets  (5~40%) 
Source: National Tax Agency (Kokuzei-chou), ed., Kokuzei-chou Toukei Nenpou-sho (The 
Statistical Yearbook of the National Tax Agency) (Tokyo: Zaidan Houjin Ookura 
Zaimu Kyoukai), 1971-2005 editions, and the website of the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/syuzei/syuzei04.htm 
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Next, we would like to confirm these trends from another perspective.  Tables 2 
and 3 show the share of taxpayers for whom each marginal tax rate applied in 1988 and 
2003, and as can be seen from these tables, the 1999 income tax reform caused the share 
of taxpayers for whom the 10% marginal tax rate applies to increase sharply from 60.8% 
to 69.7% and caused the share of taxpayers for whom the 20% marginal tax rate applies 
to decrease sharply from 28.4% to 21.7%, as a result of which the lowest marginal tax 
rate applied to a full 70% of taxpayers.  This corroborates the trend toward a less 
non-linear, less progressive, and less equitable income tax. 
 
Table 2: The Share of Taxpayers for Whom Each Marginal Tax Rate Applies (1998) 
Marginal Tax Rate          Share of Taxpayers 
10ˋ                6 0 . 8 ˋ 
20ˋ                2 8 . 4 ˋ 
30ˋ                 6 . 5 ˋ 
40ˋ                 2 . 3 ˋ 
50ˋ                 2 . 0 ˋ 
Source: National Tax Agency (Kokuzei-chou), ed., Kokuzei-chou Toukei Nenpou-sho (The 
Statistical Yearbook of the National Tax Agency) (Tokyo: Zaidan Houjin Ookura 
Zaimu Kyoukai), 1998 edition. 
 
Table 3: The Share of Taxpayers for Whom Each Marginal Tax Rate Applies (2003) 
  Marginal  Tax  Rate    Share  of  Taxpayers  17
10ˋ                    6 9 . 7 ˋ 
20ˋ                    2 1 . 7 ˋ 
30ˋ                     5 . 1 ˋ 
37ˋ                     3 . 4 ˋ 
Source: National Tax Agency (Kokuzei-chou), ed., Kokuzei-chou Toukei Nenpou-sho (The 
Statistical Yearbook of the National Tax Agency) (Tokyo: Zaidan Houjin Ookura 
Zaimu Kyoukai), 2003 edition. 
 
Moreover, Japan’s income tax is inequitable in another sense as well.  There is 
widespread evasion of income taxes by the self-employed and farmers, but salaried workers 
are unable to evade income taxes because such taxes are automatically deducted from their 
paychecks.    This leads to substantial inter-occupational inequities. 
Many years ago, Ishi (1981) found that salaried workers pay taxes on 91% of their income, 
the self-employed on 71% of their income, and farmers on 21% of their income.  More 
recently, Ohta, et al. (2003) found that inter-occupational inequities are now much less, 
with salaried workers paying taxes on 102% of their income, the self-employed on 95% of 
their income, and farmers on 81% of their income, but even if we believe these figures, 
substantial inter-occupational inequities still remain. 
 
3.2.3.  Conclusion 
Assuming that labor supply is more price-inelastic than saving, the gradual abolition 
of various tax breaks for saving (capital income) has lowered the efficiency of Japan’s  18
income tax, and the reduction in progressivity has reduced the equity thereof.  Thus, 
Japan’s recent income tax reforms have reduced the efficiency as well as the equity of the 
income tax, and thus one cannot say that they were desirable from an optimal taxation 
standpoint.  Moreover, inter-occupational inequities appear to have been reduced but not 
eliminated entirely. 
 
3.3. The Use of Personal Taxes as an Instrument of Countercyclical Policy 
Lastly, we would like to describe and evaluate the Japanese government’s use of 
personal taxes as an instrument of countercyclical policy. 
The Japanese government relied primarily on temporary income tax cuts to 
stimulate consumption and hence the economy as a whole during the decade-long recession 
of the 1990s, but theory predicts that income tax cuts will not be effective unless they are 
permanent and permanent income tax cuts would have been too costly to the government in 
terms of foregone tax revenue.    Thus, the Japanese government would have been better off 
temporarily reducing or abolishing the consumption tax instead of lowering income taxes as 
a way of stimulating the economy.   
As noted by one of the co-authors of this paper (see Horioka (2002)), such a policy 
would have had at least four advantages. 
First, it would have been effective.  Lowering or abolishing the general 
consumption tax for a fixed period of time and then raising it gradually would have 
stimulated consumption and hence the economy as a whole because consumers would have 
accelerated purchases of consumption goods, especially non-perishable goods, in order to  19
take advantage of temporarily lower consumption taxes.     
Second, it would not have cost the government very much in foregone tax revenue.   
According to the permanent income hypothesis, a temporary income tax cut would not have 
much impact on consumption because it would not have much impact on permanent income.   
In order to be effective in stimulating consumption, the income tax cut would have to be 
permanent so that it increases permanent income, but a permanent income tax cut would 
lead to a massive loss of tax revenue.  By contrast, a consumption tax cut would be more 
effective if it were temporary because only a temporary consumption tax cut would induce 
consumer to accelerate their purchases of consumption goods, and moreover, a temporary 
consumption tax cut would have the added advantage of not costing the government very 
much in terms of foregone tax revenue.   
Third, it would have been effective as a means of ending price deflation.  
Lowering or abolishing the general consumption tax for a fixed period of time and then 
raising it gradually would generate inflation, and if the inflation that is generated causes 
inflationary expectations to take root, inflation will continue even after the gradual 
increases in the consumption tax rate end.  Thus, if all goes well, the same fiscal policy 
would simultaneously stimulate consumption and end price deflation.   
Fourth, it would have been equitable.  Since the propensity to consume generally 
declines with income, low-income consumers would have received a disproportionate share 
of the benefits of the temporary consumption tax reduction or abolition.  Thus, the 
temporary consumption tax reduction or abolition would have the added benefit of 
increasing equity.  20
  Thus, a policy of temporarily reducing or abolishing the consumption tax would 
have been far preferable to the temporarily  i n c o m e  t a x  c u t s  u s e d  b y  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
government, and thus we are forced to conclude that the Japanese government used the 
wrong policy instrument in order to stimulate the economy during the 1990s. 
 
3.4. Overall Evaluation 
  Reforms of personal taxes in Japan since the 1980s have been a dismal failure, 
reducing both efficiency and equity and failing to provide a badly needed stimulus to the 
economy during the prolonged recession of the 1990s.   
 
4. Policy Recommendations 
In the foregoing sections, we conducted a theoretical analysis of personal taxes from 
the viewpoints of efficiency and equity and described and evaluated the past and present 
structures of personal taxes in Japan.  In this section, we make some policy 
recommendations based on the findings of the foregoing sections.  We strive to 
simultaneously achieve the three goals of efficiency, equity, and fiscal reconstruction. 
  Regarding the structure of the consumption tax, 
(1) We recommend implementing Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule by raising the 
tax rate of the consumption tax on complements of leisure.   
(2) We recommend raising the tax rate of the consumption tax but keeping the tax 
rate on food and other necessities unchanged.   
(3) We recommend making the imputed rent on owner-occupied housing, which is  21
currently exempt from the consumption tax, subject to the consumption tax. 
Regarding the structure of the income tax, 
(4) We recommend alleviating the disincentive effects of the income tax on saving 
by re-introducing tax breaks on saving (capital income).   
(5) We recommend increasing the progressivity of the income tax. 
(6) We recommend stricter enforcement of the income tax (for example, by 
introducing a taxpayer identification number system, increasing the number of tax 
auditors, and increasing the proportion of tax returns that are audited) 
We first explore the efficiency and equity implications of each of these 
recommendations and then explore their implications for fiscal reconstruction. 
Recommendation (1) would enhance both the efficiency and equity of the 
consumption tax (the latter because complements of leisure tend to be luxury goods), 
recommendation (2) would enhance the equity of the consumption tax but would have an 
adverse impact on its efficiency (the latter because the compensated price elasticity of 
demand for necessities is presumably lower (in absolute value) than that for other goods),̏ 
and recommendation (3) would enhance both the efficiency and equity of the consumption 
tax (the former because a previously untaxed good would now be taxed and the latter 
because owner-occupied housing is a luxury good) (Fukushima (1999) makes the same 
proposal). 
Recommendation (4) would enhance the efficiency of the income tax but would, at 
the same time, have an adverse impact on equity (assuming that the share of capital 
income in total income increases with income).  By contrast, recommendation (5) would  22
enhance the equity of the income tax but would, at the same time, have an adverse impact 
on efficiency to the extent that it discourages the labor supply of high-income individuals, 
but this effect would presumably be small since labor supply is believed to be relatively 
inelastic (see, for example, Ohtake, Takenaka and Yasui (2006)).    Finally, recommendation 
(6) would enhance the equity of the income tax by increasing the tax payments of farmers, 
the self-employed, and others who have been more successful in evading income taxes than 
salaried workers but would, at the same time, have an adverse impact on efficiency to the 
extent that it discourages the labor supply of those from whom more taxes are collected.  
However, this effect would presumably be small since labor supply is believed to be 
relatively inelastic, as mentioned above. 
Regarding the implications of our recommendations for fiscal reconstruction, all of 
our recommendations except for recommendation (4) would increase tax revenue, and thus 
our proposed reform package would, on balance, increase overall tax revenue, thereby 
reducing government deficits. 
To sum up, we are proposing the achievement of fiscal reconstruction by selectively 
raising the tax rates of the consumption tax on complements of leisure and goods other 
than necessities, by making imputed rent on owner-occupied housing subject to the 
consumption tax, by increasing the progressivity of the income tax, and by stricter 
enforcement of the income tax (combined, of course, with cuts in government expenditures).   
By contrast, the Japanese government seems intent on achieving fiscal reconstruction 
primarily by raising the consumption tax across the board, and in March 2006, the Fiscal 
System Council (Zaisei Seido-tou Shingikai) released the results of its projections showing  23
that the consumption tax will have to be raised from the current 5% to a full 22% by 2015 if 
fiscal reconstruction is to be achieved by relying solely on hikes in the consumption tax.̐ 
We are strongly opposed to this proposal because of the regressivity of the 
consumption tax, but if there is no way to avoid implementing the government’s proposal, 
we feel that it is all the more necessary to enhance the efficiency and equity of the 
consumption tax by implementing recommendations (1), (2), and (3).  Regarding 
recommendation (2), it is indeed fortunate that the Japanese government’s Tax Advisory 
Council (Zeisei Chousa-kai) has indicated its willingness to consider introducing a lower 
tax rate on food when the consumption tax is increased despite possible implementational 
difficulties if there is sufficient public support for such a proposal.   
  We are confident that, if our policy recommendations are implemented, they will 
simultaneously make Japan’s tax system more efficient as well as equitable, make possible 
the achievement of fiscal reconstruction, and revitalize Japan’s economy. 
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Endnotes 
                                                   
̍ We implicitly assume throughout that the consumer bears at least part of the burden of 
consumption taxes (i.e., that the imposition of a consumption tax induces suppliers to raise 
prices at least a little), but the incidence of consumption taxes will depend on the price 
elasticities of demand and supply, with the supplier bearing the burden of the tax if 
demand is more price-elastic than supply.    We are indebted to Midori Wakabayashi for this 
point.  
 
̎  If the life cycle model applies, individuals should save when they are young and working 
and dissave when they are old and retired.    Thus, pre-retirement individuals should 
consume less than their incomes, and since higher income pre-retirement individuals 
should be able to afford to save more, the average propensity to consume should decline 
with income, making a uniform consumption tax regressive in the case of individuals in this 
category.    By contrast, post-retirement individuals should consume more than their 
incomes, and since higher income post-retirement individuals should have more savings 
accumulated, the average propensity to consume should increase with income, making a 
uniform consumption tax progressive in the case of individuals in this category.    If we look 
at the case of an individual over his/her entire lifespan, he/she should consume his/her 
entire lifetime income if he/she does not receive or leave any bequests, and thus a uniform 
consumption tax should be neither progressive nor regressive but neutral.    However, since 
the income tax is progressive, even a neutral consumption tax will be more regressive than 
the income tax, and thus we will refer to a uniform consumption tax as being regressive 
throughout this paper. 
 
̏  Murasawa, Yuda, and Iwamoto (2005) conduct a number of simulations showing that, in 
many cases, social welfare increases when a lower tax rate is imposed on necessities 
(defined as food at home and water supply) if the society places value on equality. 
 
̐ By contrast, Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Heizo Takenaka believes 
that the consumption tax rate will have to be raised to only 8% in the early 2010s, but his 
projection may be based on unrealistic assumptions. 
 